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Abstract: The following article focuses on the impact of the September 11, 1973 coup 
in Chile on the formation of a transnational human rights network in Latin America. The 
article discusses the exemplary character of the human rights operations in Chile for other 
Latin American countries, but focuses on the formation of a transnational infrastructure 
that stimulated and accompanied the organization of human rights organizations across 
Latin America. The work of the Latin American churches and their international partners 
were at the center of the growth of the Latin American human rights movement that began 
in the 1970s.
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Resumen: El siguiente artículo se concentra en el impacto que tuvo el golpe de Estado 
chileno del 11 de septiembre de 1973 en la formación de una red transnacional de dere-
chos humanos en América Latina. El artículo discute el carácter ejemplar que tuvieron 
las operaciones de derechos humanos en Chile para otros países latinoamericanos, enfo-
cándose en la formación de una infraestructura transnacional que estimuló y acompañó 
la creación de organizaciones de derechos humanos a lo largo del continente. El trabajo 
de las Iglesias latinoamericanas y sus aliados internacionales estuvieron en el centro de 
la expansión del movimiento de derechos humanos que comenzó en los años setenta en 
América Latina. 
Palabras clave: Derechos Humanos; Historia; América Latina; Chile; Siglo xx.
1. Introduction
By the early 1970s, despite almost two decades of existence, the principles and ideas 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had not taken root in Latin American 
political discourse. The language of human rights did not catch on despite the pervasive 
authoritarianism of the region, which became accentuated as military coups succeeded 
each other after the overthrow of João Goulart in Brazil in 1964. Even in Europe and 
North America the concept of human rights was rather obscure, and in the convulsive 
years that surrounded 1968 no major movements carried them as a banner. In the late 
1960s, Amnesty International was still a movement with a small constituency and an even 
smaller budget. International standards had nevertheless continued to make progress since 
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the 1948 Declaration, most notably through the passing of the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966. 
In Latin America, this process was strengthened by the approval of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights of 1969. However, despite legal advances, the human rights 
situation had rapidly deteriorated in many Latin American countries, and the rise of mili-
tary repression was not accompanied by the emergence of human rights organizations in 
any Latin American country until the Chilean putsch. 
Unintentionally, the military coup of September 11, 1973 changed this dynamic as it 
became a watershed for the advancement of human rights practices. Thereafter human 
rights organizations would begin to appear en masse. From being practically non-existent 
in 1973, by 1981 there were more than 220 Latin American human rights organizations, 
and they would reach 550 in 1990 (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 90). The expansion of the human 
rights agenda not only extended throughout militarized Latin America, but also streng-
thened the movement in Europe and North America. While Amnesty International had 
500 groups and approximately a £20 million budget in 1969, it grew to have more than 
1600 groups and an almost £400 million budget in 1976 (Amnesty International 1977: 3). 
As this paper will show, the increase in repression alone was not the reason for the broade-
ning of the human rights agenda throughout Latin America and the world. Rather, activist 
international organizations played a crucial role in shaping the Latin American human 
rights movement, an institutional innovation that grew out of transnational dynamics that 
converged after the Chilean military coup. 
This paper proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss how previous Latin American 
migratory waves and international conventions set the course for international interven-
tion in Chile after the September 11, 1973 coup. Second, I show how the intervention 
of activist international actors was important in shifting the initial relief efforts in Chile 
towards the defense of human rights. And finally, I illustrate how – as a result of the 
activities conducted in Chile – international organizations learned how to take an activist 
position on human rights violations and acted to empower human rights actors in other 
Latin American countries.1 
 
2.  Exiles and Refugees: Setting the course for international intervention
Many observers of the Chilean case have noted that the international reaction to the 
coup and the subsequent human rights violations was quick, strong and relatively wides-
pread (Hawkins 2002; Ropp/Sikkink 2008). Although authors are quick to signal the 
transnational character of the outcomes, the explanations regarding the causes of such a 
response tend to be strictly national. A common assumption is that Chilean human rights 
1 This article relies mainly on the documents held in the Archives of the World Council of Churches in 
Geneva, in the Human Rights Resources Office for Latin America fund. Documentation concerning the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was accessed at the Library of the United Nations 
in Geneva. Additional documents for this article were acquired at the Fundación de Documentación y 
Archivos de la Vicaría de la Solidaridad, which contains the documentation produced by the first and 
largest human rights organization in Chile, and at the Centro de Documentación of the Museo de la 
Memoria, which has recently begun to centralize much of the information from other Chilean human 
rights organizations. Both archives are located in Santiago de Chile. 
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organizations were created by local churches – Catholic, Lutheran, Orthodox, Methodist 
– and the Jewish community as a response to growing repression, and that transnational 
relations were subsequently established and sustained (Hawkins 2002; Ropp/Sikkink 
2008; Wright 2007). However, despite the importance of the local churches in organizing 
relief for the victims of repression, the initial catalysts for spurring these institutions into 
action were in fact highly transnational in nature. As this section will show, the interna-
tional reaction to the Chilean coup was fundamentally motivated by the need to secure the 
safety of foreign refugees who had begun arriving in Chile in the mid-1960s. 
Due to its prolonged institutional and economic stability, Chile had been a haven 
for Latin American exiles since as early as the nineteenth century. During the state- and 
nation-building phases of the nineteenth century in Latin America, disputes among elites 
routinely ended with the sidelined factions having to seek refuge in neighboring coun-
tries. Chile received various waves of Argentinean, Peruvian, and Bolivian exiles during 
the 1830s and 1840s, alongside some prominent intellectuals from other countries of the 
region such as Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Sznajder/Roniger 2009: 94-100). 
Between 1964 and 1973, as military regimes began to proliferate throughout the region, 
Chile once again began to massively receive Latin American exiles. 
With a combination of supportive governing coalitions and the presence of important 
international institutions, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which had 
their regional offices in Santiago, Chile became a favored destination for many prominent 
left-wing politicians. Brazilian exiles, in particular, came to play a predominant role in 
Chilean politics as ministers of the deposed João Goulart government and Brazilian inte-
llectuals worked as advisors to Allende and found posts in the Chilean government, univer-
sities, and international research centers. Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Darcy Ribeiro, and Paulo Freire were some of the personalities among the almost 4,000 
Brazilians that came to Chile to escape the military government (Sznajder/Roniger 2009: 
103-104). After the putsch in Uruguay – another important political haven – in early 1973, 
Latin American exiles increasingly began to seek refuge in Chile. It was estimated that 
approximately 25,000 persons arrived in the 1964-1973 exile wave.2
Though many of the exiles that found refuge in Chile belonged to the middle and 
upper classes, and were thus able to live off allowances sent from their families or find 
well-paid professional positions, most of the exiles were of working-class origins and 
encountered great difficulties adjusting to their host country (Sznajder/Roniger 2009: 
201-202). In light of this situation, President Allende consulted with different ecclesias-
tical representatives on how to help these exiles adapt to Chilean life. The head of the 
Chilean Lutheran Church, Bishop Helmut Frenz, established the Diaconía in 1970, which 
served as an institution for social assistance and development and focused especially on 
supporting the arrival of Latin American exiles (Frenz 2006: 95-97). The work of the 
Diaconía was financed through grants provided by the Church World Service of the US 
National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF).3 
2 J. da Silva, “Memorandum to Alan Brash, CICARWS director, concerning fundraising for Chile”, 
September 19, 1973. Archive of the World Council of Churches. Human Rights Resources Office for 
Latin America. Box 429.01.04/01. All documents from this archive will onward be identified as AWCC 
with the corresponding box number.
3 Interview with Charles Harper, Coordinator of the Chile Emergency Desk and Director of the Human 
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Until April 27, 1972, when Allende subscribed to the 1967 United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, the legal status of Latin American exiles in Chile 
was equivalent to that of immigrants. Thereafter, exiles who applied for refugee status 
were subject to the guarantees provided by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, and fell under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).
The 1951 Convention was the outcome of international legal mechanisms to respond 
to the massive displacement of persons that resulted from both world wars and the perse-
cution faced by certain national groups and political activists during Europe’s authori-
tarian backlash in the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, the Convention imposed temporal 
and geographical limitations on the status of refugees, recognizing as such only those 
persons who had become refugees in the European crises that occurred before January 1, 
1951. The main objective of the 1967 Protocol was therefore to remove these limitations 
and make the protection of refugees universal. The restrictions of the Convention did 
not merely pose a semantic problem but also an operative one, since they impeded the 
effective intervention of the UNHCR – which had a universal mandate – in new cases of 
massive displacement that began as a result of decolonization in Africa during the 1960s. 
By expanding the scope of protection for refugees, the 1967 Protocol also imposed on 
signatory countries the obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of its 
functions and in particular with the application of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 
Protocol. 
According to both treaties, a refugee is any person who “owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or 
return there because there is a fear of persecution” (UNHCR 2010: 14). Being ‘outside’ 
the country of origin is an intrinsic part of the condition of a refugee, irrespective of the 
reasons he or she had to leave the country. However, the key idea behind a special status 
for refugees was the recognition that they are a distinct category of migrants who deserve 
special attention and help, and who by no means should be sent back to any country where 
they might fear persecution. In this sense, the most important obligation imposed by the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on signatory host countries is the principle of 
non-refoulment, which prescribes that no refugee should be returned to his or her country 
of origin or to any country where he or she may be at risk of persecution.4
Chile’s timely ratification of the 1967 Protocol therefore had profound effects on the 
unfolding of the events that followed the 1973 military coup, since the international huma-
nitarian response was not triggered first and foremost by widespread violence and repres-
sion against Chileans, but was rather a reaction to the presence of the Latin American 
refugees in Chile and to the obligations of the Chilean state to guarantee their protection 
in accordance with international agreements. 
Rights Resources Office for Latin America of the World Council of Churches. Geneva, Switzerland, 
March 9 and 10, 2011. 
4 On the 1951 Convention see Zimmermann (2011).
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The days that succeeded the military coup were characterized by the scarcity of infor-
mation on the events occurring in Chile. The military junta closed the borders, which 
stalled the entry of international observers who could transmit reliable information on the 
situation. The regional representative of the UNHCR, for example, was denied entry on 
September 15, 1973. Additionally, radio reports received in Europe, which were vividly 
relayed and discussed by international agencies seeking their confirmation, informed 
listeners that the military junta had begun “killing refugees/exiles (more or less shoo-
ting them on sight)”; was “herding refugees/exiles together, taking them over in buses 
to (at least two) football stadiums which have been converted into provisional prisoners’ 
camps”, and was “reiterating that the main urgency and goal of the coup was to get hold of 
and rid of all the […] refugees/exiles in Chile.”5 Additionally, international agencies were 
concerned that after detention, the military junta would begin to send exiles and refugees 
back to their countries of origin.
According to UNHCR figures, by 1973 approximately 15,000 persons were officially 
registered as refugees in Chile,6 many of whom had been helped at some point in their relo-
cation by international organizations such as the UNHCR, the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migrations (ICEM).7 Since 
many of these exiles had been opposition leaders in their countries of origin, the military 
coup in Chile placed them in a particularly difficult position: the risk for them was not 
only being captured by the Chilean military, but, even worse, the possibility of being 
handed over to the military regimes from which they had initially fled. And since almost 
half of the total exile population in Chile was not protected by the refugee conventions, 
the toppling of the Unidad Popular created an extremely hazardous situation for many 
exiles. This point was raised in internal communications of the WCC:
Certain persons from those countries [Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay] now residing in 
Chile are not technically refugees, but there are among them many important and higstanding 
[sic.] opposition leaders of the countries just mentioned, who would be immediately arrested, 
perhaps tortured and killed if the regimes in their respective countries get them under their 
control.8
The fears were not unwarranted. Shortly before the coup the slogan “JAKARTA 
IS THE GOAL”, in reference to the almost 500 thousand people who were killed in 
Indonesia’s 1965-1966 anticommunist purge, appeared painted across Santiago’s walls. 
And in its first public statements, the military junta began to identify the Latin American 
exiles/refugees as the main target of repression by justifying the coup on account of the 
presence of foreign communist ‘extremists’ in figures that resembled the number of refu-
gees registered by the UNHCR. The regime stated that there were approximately “14,000 
5 L.J. Niilus, Director CCIA, “Chile Emergency. New developments. Need for urgent action. Proposals”, 
Sep 15, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
6 World Council of Churches Communication, “WCC General Secretary urges Chilean Junta to Respect 
Refugee Rights”, September 14, 1973. AWCC, 429.07.25.
7 L.J. Niilus, Director CCIA, “Memorandum to Philip Potter, WCC General Secretary”, September 14, 
1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
8 L.J. Niilus, Director CCIA, “Memorandum to Philip Potter, WCC General Secretary”, September 14, 
1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
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armed extremists in the country”, whose purpose was to “instigate a civil war” (Amnesty 
International 1974: 64). In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
October 1973, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that the foreigners’ “sole 
mission was to set up a parallel army to oppose the regular armed forces.”9 
In reaction to the atmosphere of extreme xenophobia created by the military junta 
and to accounts of the deportation of Bolivians to their country of origin,10 the High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Aga Khan, sent Chile’s Minister of Foreign 
Relations a telegram reminding him of Chile’s obligations to international conventions 
and explicitly addressed the principle of non-refoulment (UNHCR 1975: 4). This diplo-
matic exchange was immediately followed by the establishment of coordination between 
the UNHCR and the junta in order to organize the relocation of foreign refugees. The 
regional representative of the UNHCR for Latin America, Oldrich Haselman, entered the 
country as soon as the borders reopened on September 18, 1973 to pressure the military 
junta to uphold the international protocols and to establish a local office to secure the safe 
transit of foreign refugees. On September 21, 1973, Haselman met with the Minister of 
Foreign Relations, where he reiterated the High Commissioner’s appeal. During a second 
meeting on September 24, the UNHCR representative discussed working modalities with 
the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Interior regarding the procedures 
for the identification of refugees, the regularization of their situation, and the actions to 
be taken in case they wished to abandon Chile. By September 25, 1973, these conversa-
tions were advanced to the point that the Chilean government agreed to recognize refugee 
status, and abide by the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol, acceding to cooperate 
with the international community’s efforts to secure the safety of the foreign refugees 
residing in Chile.11
In the days that immediately followed the coup, many foreigners sought the help of 
Bishop Frenz, who had helped them at some point through the work of the Diaconía. 
Haselman, having heard of this work upon his arrival in Chile, contacted Bishop Frenz 
in order to establish a local committee to handle the tasks involved in the process of 
refugee relocation. These contacts led to the creation of the Comité Nacional de Ayuda 
a los Refugiados (CONAR). As conversations between the UNHCR, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and the military junta advanced, CONAR was officially 
authorized on October 3, 1973, by Decree 1308 of the Ministry of the Interior.12 The 
decree authorized the Committee to function for a period of three months, until December 
31, 1973, and delimited its objectives:
9 Speech before the UN General Assembly reproduced in Birns (1974: 46).
10 “Chile Junta cites threat by aliens”, The New York Times, 14.09.1973.
11 N.G. Gussing, Refugee Department CICARWS, “Memorandum to Stanley Mitton concerning refugee 
status”, September 27, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/02; I. Huerta Díaz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, 
“Permanent Mission of Chile to the International Organizations in Geneva: Letter concerning refugees 
in Chile”, October 19, 1973. AWCC, 429.07.25; UNHCR, “Addendum to the Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees; General Assembly, 28th Session”, 1973, p. 26. United Nations Office 
at Geneva Library (onward UNOG); Interview with Charles Harper, Geneva, Switzerland, March 9 and 
10, 2011. 
12 CONAR, “Informe Sinóptico del Comité Nacional de Ayuda a los Refugiados”, February, 1974. Centro 
de Documentación-Museo de la Memoria, Fondo CONAR (onward, CD-MM).
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The National Committee for Aid to Refugees will have as its sole purpose to cooperate with 
the Chilean government in the resolution of the problems which affect the foreign refugees 
in our country, giving them material aid, helping them to leave the country through legal 
avenues for the country of their choice, or regularizing their presence in the country (Amnesty 
International 1974: 65).
CONAR was administered mainly by the Evangelical and Lutheran Churches, while 
UNHCR experts helped in the more technical aspects of refugee relocation. CONAR had 
a total of 26 refugee reception centers, 15 located in Santiago and 11 in the provinces, 
which had the objective of receiving those refugees who felt unsafe, or who were waiting 
to be relocated to third countries. An additional refuge, placed under the protection of 
the Swiss Embassy and known as the ‘Swiss house’, was set up to receive the cases of 
homeless refugees and to grant asylum to the foreigners who were released from the 
National Stadium with an expulsion order until they could be relocated abroad. Due to 
the restrictions on movement, CONAR managed almost every activity of the people in 
their custody, from legal assistance and medical care to leisure and clothing, and also 
supplied provisions to the embassies that had granted political asylum. There were three 
departments, under the coordination of an Executive Secretary: a legal department, social 
aid, and documentation. Between September 13, 1973 and January 31, 1974, CONAR 
sheltered and secured the safe emigration of 4,442 persons, which included refugees and 
their families.13
3. Shifting the Agenda: from Refugees to Human Rights
While the international community had begun to confront the plight of the Latin 
American refugees through CONAR, the possibilities of coming to a similar arrangement 
to help distressed Chileans were remote. The only international legal instrument avai-
lable for the protection of Chileans in national territory was the 1954 Caracas Convention 
on Diplomatic Asylum, which granted asylum seekers in foreign embassies protection 
from the territorial state. Chilean political activists who were aware of this disposition 
were quick to jump over embassy walls as the coup unfolded. However, since only Latin 
American countries plus Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti were signatories of 
the Caracas Convention, this was not a solution that could be used on a larger scale. 
Additionally, some embassies located in apartments were difficult to access and were 
guarded to avoid the entrance of asylum seekers. Those who could not make it into the 
embassies fled the country through clandestine mountain passes into the neighboring 
countries of Argentina, Peru and Bolivia. In total, approximately 20,000 Chileans fled the 
country between September 1973 and August 1974.14
13 CONAR, “Informe Sinóptico del Comité Nacional de Ayuda a los Refugiados”, February, 1974; CONAR, 
“Informe de la Comisión de Emergencia”, February, 1974; CONAR, “Informe del Departamento de 
Asistencia Social”, February, 1974. CD-MM.
14 Chile Emergency Office, WCC, “Progress Report, Chile Task Force”, June 22, 1974. AWCC, 
429.01.04/01. A 1979 ICEM report estimated that by 1974 there were at least 15,000 Chilean refugees in 
Argentina and 1,500 in Peru (quoted by Angell 2007: 9). 
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Nonetheless, the partnerships established by the UNHCR to operate CONAR would 
prove to be decisive in shifting international support towards defending Chileans who 
were suffering political persecution. On September 18, 1973, Bishop Helmut Frenz 
contacted the World Council of Churches in Geneva requesting their support for the relo-
cation of refugees.15 The WCC became a partner organization in financing the functioning 
of CONAR and played a major role in establishing refugee centers for the reception of 
Chileans in Argentina and Peru. A refugee committee in Buenos Aires was formed by 
church leaders with close contacts to the WCC, and a committee in Lima was formed as 
a result of requests made by Peruvian officials. By mid-October, the WCC had provided 
these committees with financial assistance.16 While CONAR in Santiago was established 
to manage the cases of foreigners facing problems in Chile, the Argentinean and Peruvian 
committees became important in receiving many of the Chileans who began crossing the 
borders fleeing persecution. Other committees to receive Chileans supported by the WCC 
were established in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico.17
The WCC had provided relief in other major humanitarian crises even before its offi-
cial foundation in 1948. Founded by North American and European Protestant churches in 
Amsterdam, the WCC was the crystallization of a Christian ecumenical movement which 
postulated the necessity of cooperating across denominational divides and acted under the 
conviction that theological reflection could not be separated from social action. Before its 
formal constitution, many of the WCC commissions had already been in place for several 
years. The Geneva office had a staff of 142 people at the moment of the WCC foundation, 
and had been coordinating the work of the churches during the Second World War. Its 
departments played important roles in lobbying for the human rights agenda before the 
United Nations and responded to major refugee situations, such as the aftermath of World 
War II, the Palestine partition in 1948-49, and the Korean War in 1950 (Van Elderen 1992: 
18-25).
By the 1960s, increasingly influenced by the presence of non-Western points of view, a 
global perspective began to gain ascendancy in the agenda of the WCC. In 1961, the WCC 
effectively became a global body through the incorporation of new churches from Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, and Orthodox churches from the Eastern bloc. The Conference 
on Church and Society held in Geneva in 1966 to generate reflection about the turbulent 
social processes occurring throughout the world was crucial for transforming the repre-
sentation of the WCC’s global constituency into policy. The Geneva conference paralleled 
the Catholic Church’s Second Vatican Council and, as in its Catholic counterpart, esta-
blished the necessity of the Churches’ commitment with the processes of social change 
going on in the world, dovetailing the growing influence of Liberation Theology in Latin 
America. Most of the 420 participants were laypeople, and more than half of them repre-
sented Asia, Africa, and Latin America, “making it the first large ecumenical conference 
in which Western participants were not in the majority” (Van Elderen 1992: 29). 
This growing global representation was also reflected in the composition of the WCC’s 
Geneva staff. Since the governing bodies of the WCC only met every couple of years to 
15 L.J. Niilus, Director CCIA, “Chile Emergency. Followup”, Sep 18, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
16 N.G. Gussing, Refugee Department CICARWS, “Letter to CICARWS related agencies on Chile appeal”, 
October 18, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/02.
17 Chile Task Force, “WCC Report of the WCC Emergency Task Force on the Chilean Situation for Unit II 
Meeting in West Berlin, August 7-9, 1974”, [around August 1974]. AWCC, 429.02.01.
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analyze the work and set guidelines for future actions, the Geneva office had the crucial 
task of carrying out the daily activities that allowed the programs to function. By the time 
of the Chilean coup in 1973, the Geneva office of the WCC had a large number of Latin 
Americans “in positions of influence and power”.18 The presence of the Latin American 
staff in the WCC is particularly important in explaining the organization’s participation 
with CONAR. 
Already before the first formal contacts with Bishop Frenz were established, the 
Latin American staff of the WCC mobilized “to help those most seriously threatened by 
the junta in their first official declarations: the foreign residents in Chile.”19 This inte-
rest was motivated by both affective and ideological affinities. Argentinean, Brazilian, 
and Uruguayan exiles were part of the WCC’s Geneva staff, and they and their personal 
networks in Europe and North America were keen on securing the safety of their coun-
trymen and women. Additionally, the staff was concerned about leftist church leaders 
and church members who had been helped to move to Chile through its refugee program, 
escaping persecution in their own countries. Finally, the mainly progressive staff of the 
WCC was worried about the safety of Chilean ecclesiastical leaders and church members 
who had been supportive of the Allende government.
In their cooperation with CONAR, an agency with semi-autonomous stature, the 
WCC was officially recognized by the military junta. This recognition would facilitate the 
entrance of the WCC delegations that visited Chile during the four months that the refugee 
operation lasted. On September 25 1973, Theo Tschuy, a Swiss national, and Director 
of the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS), and Annie Went van der 
Wring, Director of the Dutch Interchurch Agency for Refugees, left for Buenos Aires, 
Santiago, and Lima with the task of consulting with church leaders and meeting with 
the representatives of international organizations in Santiago to coordinate and define 
the strategy for the Chile refugee situation.20 Furthermore, the Tschuy-Went mission had 
the task of coordinating the churches in Argentina and Peru, and their respective govern-
ments, for the reception of exiles arriving from Chile.21
The general impressions of the situation provided by the Tschuy-Went report were 
extremely acute in signaling how the divisions of the Cold War were reflected in Chile. As 
it claimed that Santiago looked like an occupied city, the report indicated that the “most 
terrible aspect of this all-embracing campaign of terror [were] the on-the-spot execu-
tions most of which take place during the curfew hours at night.”22 The report, however, 
was also clear in highlighting the selective class composition of repression by signaling 
that the display of raw-power was more visible in the poor neighborhoods than in the 
upper-class sectors of the city. By contrast, the coup had brought relief to the inhabi-
tants of Santiago’s rich neighborhoods, “where the social power base of the Chilean right 
18 Interview with Charles Harper, Geneva, Switzerland, March 9 and 10, 2011.
19 D. Epps, CCIA, “Memorandum. Notes on Chile to Philip Potter, WCC General Secretary”, January 25, 
1974. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
20 S. Mitton, Emergencies Officer, WCC, “Letter to Cornelius Koch of Solidarité Chrétienne, Fribourg”, 
September 26, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/01.
21 S. Mitton, Emergencies Officer, WCC, “Letter to CICARWS related agencies on developments in Chile 
and funding”, September 20, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.04/02.
22 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], p. 
5. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
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is concentrated (National Party, Christian Democrats)”, by ending “the ‘nightmare’ of 
Allende’s Unidad Popular.”23 These perceptions helped shape the opinion of ambassadors 
of important Western countries through the close social contacts they established with the 
Chilean upper class:
As foreign embassies are located in the Barrio Alto [upper-class neighborhoods] and their 
local contacts limited to members of the middle and upper classes, we found that the view of 
diplomats we met reflected faithfully the ideas of these surroundings. The European embassies 
obstinately refused to take into account the fate of refugees and Chileans in danger, under the 
pretext that they have received no instruction from home. They themselves seemed to take no 
initiative to inform themselves properly and to request to inform their respective home gover-
nment to consider humanitarian action. The Swiss ambassador, Mr. Masset, told us clearly that 
if he accepted refugees the local Swiss colony would be angered. Only as he began to realize 
that his attitude might result in bad publicity back home, he softened his stand slightly. Other 
embassies reacted similarly.”24 
This passage reveals much about the interaction between the national and the interna-
tional level. Despite the widespread international condemnation of the military takeover, 
the local response of foreign delegates was rather reflective of the Chilean power struc-
tures. The solidarity expressed by many foreign delegations was more in tune with their 
conservative local base, and their structure of relations, than with what could be consi-
dered universal principles of human welfare.25 
The Tschuy-Went report, however, not only gave a critical appraisal of the general 
state of affairs in Chile, but also fundamentally redefined the intervention of the WCC in 
their cooperation with local partners. This was reflected in the apprehensions expressed 
in the report regarding the limitations the UNHCR mandate imposed on the actions of the 
CONAR and, hence, on the WCC:
The government has set a 3-month time limit for the Committee to remove the refugees. After 
that the Committee will apparently cease to exist, as it is not permitted to help Chilean natio-
nals wishing to go abroad. With other words, this Committee has no authority –and probably 
no [other] desire than to function strictly within the limits set by the UNCHR’s [sic.] mandate 
and the rules drawn by the Junta. It is this complete identification of purpose of a Christian 
and now WCC national committee to the UNHCR and the Junta which causes us concern.26
23 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], 
p.5. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
24 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], p. 
5. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
25 The Swedish embassy, with its ambassador Mr. Edelstam, was a notable exception to this. Immediately 
after the coup, the Swedish government took over the protection of the Cuban representation in Chile thus 
securing the safety of their diplomats, and of the people who had sought refuge there, and was actively 
engaged in guaranteeing the safety of foreign refugees. On the latter see International Herald Tribune, 
27.11.1973. Other European embassies that were receptive of people seeking asylum were Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France, and Finland. 
26 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], p. 
6. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
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The report therefore emphasized the inconvenient position in which the international 
community’s efforts were placed through its cooperation with the refugee committee, 
and the scarce effects this would have in providing assistance to Chileans suffering 
persecution. First, because it was in the junta’s interest to have the refugees taken out 
of the country, which would have the immediate effect of reducing the tension with the 
international community and, therefore, the presence and oversight of the UNHCR was 
seen by the military government as a functional intervention. Second, the mandate of the 
UNHCR followed strict guidelines which were based on the 1951 Convention on Refugee 
Status, approved by UN member states, and stressed the non-political nature of its invol-
vement. This course of action reflected the multilateral character of the UNHCR, where 
the Chilean government had access to the information of its formal activities through the 
participation of observers in the sessions of the UNHCR Executive Committee (UNHCR 
1974). These characteristics limited the scope of action of CONAR, being reduced strictly 
to humanitarian aid along UNHCR principles.27 Following these guidelines, Chileans who 
needed to seek asylum and those forced to stay in the country were extremely neglected. 
Third, the strict control imposed by the military on the refugee operation also had the 
effect of scaring off those foreigners who might be privileged targets: “They fear […] 
arrest, forcible repatriation, or worse.”28 CONAR’s operation therefore did not actually 
serve those foreign refugees who were most seriously threatened. 
The Tschuy-Went report picked up on this right-left tension within the operation they 
were helping to carry out. The document expressed their concern regarding some of the 
people in charge of the refugee committee. The Executive Secretary of CONAR, Samuel 
Nalegash, and Gustav Zeppelin, the Chilean-German representative of the Diaconía, were 
especially distrusted by the members of the WCC mission because of their open support 
for the military junta. Also, the sympathy for the military regime expressed by many 
Chilean church leaders attracted the concern of the WCC delegation. When Tschuy read 
them the cable sent to Pinochet by the WCC General Secretary, the church leaders reacted 
by strongly criticizing the tone used by the WCC against the military junta. After this 
encounter with Chilean church leaders, the Tschuy-Went report concluded that right-wing 
positions were “gaining ascendance in the Chilean churches”29 and that sectors of the left 
– such as Christians for Socialism – would basically have to retreat in the new scenario.
This reading of the circumstances had a profound effect on setting the course of action 
for the following months. Although the WCC would continue to help in the refugee opera-
tion, the attention of the Geneva teams would be redirected toward the dangers faced 
by Chileans. To this purpose, the Tschuy-Went delegation contacted Catholic Bishop 
Fernando Ariztía to start the conversation on forming a commission to address the human 
rights problem. Mgr. Ariztía recalled this episode:
27  “In endorsing the general policy followed by the High Commissioner, several members of the Committee 
stressed that the attainment of the UNHCR’s objective was largely due to the careful, strictly non-political, 
humanitarian and unbiased approach observed by the Office in dealing with refugee problems which 
themselves were often of a highly complex and delicate nature” (UNHCR 1973: 7).
28 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], p. 
6. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
29 Tschuy, [HEKS] and Went, “Tschuy/Went Report, September-October 1973”, [around October 1973], p. 
6. AWCC, 429.01.05/01.
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A commission from the World Council of Churches came around September 25 of 1973; this 
is, about two weeks after the coup. They came to talk to me; I was the Auxiliary Bishop 
of Santiago’s Western Zone […]. They said: “look, the problem with the foreigners will be 
solved in a couple of months, but the problem that is still unsolved is the problem with the 
Chileans. So it would be convenient to create a more stable organism, more permanent to tend 
to the Human Rights violations” (Fundación de Documentación y Archivo de la Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad 2002: 13).
Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez authorized the Catholic Church’s involvement and 
appointed Ariztía as his representative. Soon after, on October 4, 1973, the Comité de 
Cooperación para la Paz en Chile (COPACHI) was formed with the participation of the 
Lutheran, Methodist, and Orthodox Churches, and the head of the Jewish community. The 
WCC appointed Rev. Frenz as their representative on the Committee, he shared his duties 
with Mgr. Ariztía. By January 1974, this committee was receiving increasing economic 
support from the WCC, after the refugee operation had more or less come to a close. The 
WCC had thus effectively shifted its line of work within Chile from the refugee to the 
human rights problem.
4. From Chile to Latin America: The Human Rights Resources Office for Latin 
America
The strategy to support COPACHI through increased technical and financial help 
proved successful in the short-term. In less than nine months, the Committee grew to 
reach a staff of 135 persons who worked in 23 offices throughout Chile, and in the first 
semester of 1974 attended more than 12,000 cases which ranged from arbitrary dismis-
sals to disappearances. In 1975, COPACHI had a 180-person staff in Santiago alone, and 
another 160 persons worked in 22 offices across the country.30 That year, the departments 
for social assistance, legal aid, and labor issues handled more than 20,000 cases, and 
the health program provided medical assistance to more than 60,000 people (COPACHI 
1975: Annex 2.1). In its short career, COPACHI became a model for defending human 
rights in sites of repression. 
The shift towards upholding human rights on the ground, however, would not only 
have consequences for Chile, but also for the rest of Latin America. As the programs 
in Chile consolidated, so did their coordination within the World Council of Churches. 
Initially, the WCC’s response to Chile had been conducted under the coordination of 
the Director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), the 
Argentinean Leopoldo Niilus, and a group of staffers who had connections with Latin 
America. However, since the scope of the WCC’s involvement rapidly expanded to 
include the refugee centers in Argentina and Peru, the ad hoc nature of the first team 
quickly became obsolete. The first WCC delegation, and the logistics and coordination 
required for their success, prompted the need to revise the initial arrangements. This gave 
30 Sub-Committee on International Organizations of the House of Representatives, “Chile: La situación de 
los derechos humanos y su relación con los programas de asistencia económica de los Estados Unidos. 
Declaración de José Zalaquett”, May 5, 1976, p. 20. Fundación de Documentación y Archivos de la 
Vicaría de la Solidaridad.
The Unintended Legacy of September 11, 1973 99
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 X
III
, 5
1 
(2
01
3)
, 8
7-
10
3
way to the creation of the ‘Chile Task Force’ which had “two clearly defined responsibi-
lities: a) That of formulation of policy guidelines […]; b) Attend to practical and opera-
tional details such as communications at all levels of WCC membership, contacts, etc., 
concrete and urgent response to the refugee situation, and coordination and action of all 
these interrelated activities.”31 
These activities proved to be unmanageable for the members of the Chile Task Force, 
who in addition to the handling of the Chilean cases also had to carry out their day-to-day 
activities at the WCC. In November 1973, as the WCC prepared to send a second delega-
tion to Chile, Argentina, and Peru, a small office was created to be occupied solely by those 
handling the Chile emergency programs – as the refugee and human rights operations in 
Chile were called within the organization. This office was called the Chile Emergency 
Desk and was staffed by a coordinator and a secretary to administer all the information 
regarding the Chilean coup that went in and out of the WCC. The Chile Task Force took 
on a new role, being a source of counsel and support, but removed from the day-to-day 
activities of the Chile programs. The Chile Emergency Desk gave the international 
support of the Chilean organizations a new dimension, by establishing a stable channel of 
communication between international agencies and people willing to work for the defense 
of human rights on the ground. Consequently, funding became stabilized through annual 
funding provided by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). As 1973 
drew to a close, the participation of the WCC in Chile, which was not thought to last 
beyond the three months the refugee operation required, had created an institutionalized 
channel of communication and support between Europe and Latin America. 
The financial consolidation of the Chile Emergency Desk and the increasing repres-
sion in Latin America produced the final institutional rearrangement within the WCC. In 
early 1974, after the programs in Chile had stabilized and the initial sense of emergency 
wound down, the Coordinator of the Chile Emergency Desk, Charles Harper, exchanged 
thoughts with the Deputy Director of the Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugees and 
World Service (CICARWS), Graeme Jackson, regarding possible institutional steps to be 
taken, especially to address the deteriorating situation of human rights in Latin America. 
The WCC’s response to the Chilean case was seen as a model that could be replicated in 
other Latin American countries, and a new institutional structure would be required to 
carry out this task. These reflections led to the creation of the Human Rights Resources 
Office for Latin America (HRROLA). Between 1975 and 1991, despite its obscure name 
and its extremely low profile, HRROLA was a major player in coordinating responses to 
gross human rights violations, by providing technical expertise or providing the resources 
required for the organization of human rights organisms, and in the dissemination of 
information that increased awareness about human rights violations in Latin America. 
HRROLA was conceived to be, at once, an organ for theoretical reflection and opera-
tive involvement. The Chile Task Force’s experience of analysis and decision-making was 
seen as a positive model in this respect. Additionally, it was thought best that it not have 
a fixed agenda, and rather act – again taking the Chilean case as a model – on an ad hoc 
basis “to maintain flexibility to respond quickly to situations in a political context to which 
31 J. da Silva, “Confidential/Urgent Memorandum to WCC staff regarding creation of a Chile Task Force”, 
Oct 2, 1973. AWCC, 429.01.08.
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the churches, and the WCC, should be sensitive.”32 First, the mandate of the HRROLA 
would be to continue the work of the Chile Emergency Desk, supporting and allocating 
funds for the COPACHI, disengaging itself however from the refugee cases that were still 
pending. The focus was thus strictly on human rights. Second, the HRROLA would have 
an expanding mandate insofar as it was constituted to address problems that had not yet 
arisen, but were foreseeable in the near future, as could be observed towards 1975 in the 
growing right-wing paramilitary activity in Argentina. Third, its task was to develop new 
and efficient “operational ‘contingency plans’ […] for groups and persons who will be 
in tight spots, in other Latin American countries than just Chile.”33 Fourth, it was to be a 
resource in documentation for international organizations and decision-making within the 
WCC. The material would not be produced, but would rather be synthesized, made avai-
lable, and sometimes even prompted by HRROLA. Finally, HRROLA sought to support 
the organization of Latin American exiles and refugees in Europe, and participate in the 
passing of legislation to better their situation. The remainder of this section will provide 
examples of this cooperation with cases from Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil. 
The Uruguayan military dictatorship, which began in July 1973, did not raise much 
international attention. However, Uruguay’s vibrant progressive ecumenical commu-
nity represented in the Iglesia Evangélica Metodista del Uruguay (IEMU) and in the 
ecumenical organization Iglesia y Sociedad en América Latina (ISAL) helped establish 
international ties early in the crisis. Since the mid-1960s Uruguay had been a haven for 
Brazilian exiles, most notably due to the presence in the country of the deposed presi-
dent João Goulart. After Uruguay’s coup, many of the Uruguayan ecumenical leaders 
were forced into exile, and some were appointed to positions in international ecumenical 
organizations. In 1973 pastor Emilio Castro took a post as Director of the Commission of 
World Mission and Evangelism of the WCC, and later succeeded Philip Potter as General 
Secretary of the organization in 1985. 
These close ties between the Uruguayan Methodists and the international ecumenical 
movement, and the Chilean precedent, facilitated the work of IEMU, with the coopera-
tion of UNHCR and CICARWS, in the relocation of Uruguayans abroad in 1974. Further 
transnational efforts concentrated on providing assistance to political prisoners and their 
families, and on increasing awareness of repression in Uruguay among the international 
community. The HRROLA contributed financial and material assistance for the families 
of political prisoners through the parish work of the Methodist pastors Ademar Olivera 
and Óscar Bolioli, and the Oficina de Asesoramiento y Administración de Proyectos 
Ecuménicos Latinoamericanos (OAAPEL). In 1974, due to increasing threats against 
them in Uruguay, the OAAPEL moved its offices to Buenos Aires. When the coup in 
Argentina occurred in 1976, Oscar Bolioli, who had been an active participant in the 
Chilean refugee operations, helped Argentineans escape the country to Uruguay, Chile, 
Brazil, and Canada, the latter due to the convenience of a direct Buenos Aires-Toronto 
flight (Olivera 2009: 120-121). The WCC also invested considerable resources to support 
32 C. Harper, Coordinator Chile Emergency Office, “Memorandum from Charles Harper to Graeme Jackson 
with notes regarding the creation of a Human Rights Office at the WCC”, February 1, 1974, p. 5. AWCC, 
429.02.01.
33 C. Harper, Coordinator Chile Emergency Office, “Memorandum from Charles Harper to Graeme Jackson 
with notes regarding the creation of a Human Rights Office at the WCC”, February 1, 1974, p. 3. AWCC, 
429.02.01.
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a program to heighten awareness of the Uruguayan military dictatorship in Europe. A 
group of Argentinean, Brazilian, and French lawyers and jurists joined their Uruguayan 
colleagues to create the International Secretariat of Jurists for Amnesty and Democracy in 
Uruguay, which organized high-profile international conferences, issued newsletters, and 
lobbied for the support of European politicians to isolate the Uruguayan military regime 
(Harper 2006: 22-23). 
The country that most quickly benefitted from the human rights infrastructure esta-
blished after the Chilean military coup was Argentina. The Chilean exiles that began to 
flee across the border prompted the creation of the Comité Argentino para los Refugiados 
(CAREF) in late 1973, organized on the initiative of the WCC, represented by Theo 
Tschuy, and the Argentinean Methodist and Lutheran Churches, and the Evangelical 
Church of the Rio de la Plata, all directly affiliated to the WCC. CAREF was a forerunner 
of the Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos (APDH), founded in 1975, and 
the Movimiento Ecuménico de Derechos Humanos (MEDH), founded just a few days 
before the military coup in Argentina on March 19, 1976. Pastor José de Luca, of the 
MEDH, recalled “how Argentineans had been warned and taught to be ready for the 
repression which was coming, by the very fact that Argentina had taken into its midst 
during the previous three years the Uruguayan and Chilean refugees, who became in a real 
sense, their mentors” (Harper 2006: 49). However, the Argentinean organizations not only 
benefited from the Chilean and Uruguayan experience, but also from their transnational 
networks. HRROLA provided these organizations with moral and financial support. The 
WCC later also supported the organization and work carried out by the Abuelas de la 
Plaza de Mayo. 
HRROLA’s cooperation in Brazil had traits resembling the efforts in Uruguay, 
Argentina, and Chile. While the actions of HRROLA in Uruguay and Argentina starkly 
relied on the action of the WCC member churches, in Chile the collaboration with the 
Catholic Church was more intense. HRROLA thus engaged in the efforts of the ecume-
nical communities of the Brazilian Northeast to disseminate information on repression 
around the world, and contributed moral and financial assistance to help political priso-
ners. With the help of HRROLA, a human-rights awareness-raising campaign was laun-
ched in 1975 by the Coordenadoria Ecumênica de Serviço (CESE). Thirty articles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accompanied by biblical quotations and theo-
logical references, were published and circulated among the churches of every Brazilian 
state (Harper 2006: 9). With a vast Catholic constituency and the presence of progres-
sive bishops in key regions, the WCC’s cooperation in Brazil also concentrated on esta-
blishing ties with key Catholic leaders, such as the Archbishop of Recife, Dom Helder 
Camara, and the Cardinal Archbishop of São Paulo, Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns. Initially, in 
1977, the Archbishopric of São Paulo set up a special team, named CLAMOR, to receive 
Argentinean, Uruguayan, and Chilean exiles escaping from Argentina who did not want 
authorities to have knowledge of their presence (Frühling/Alberti/Portales 1989: 98). The 
group used many of the tactics that had been tested by COPACHI in helping Chileans and 
Latin American exiles secretly leave Chile. 
The most important cooperation project between the WCC and the Brazilian Catholic 
Church was the production of the book Brasil: Nunca Mais, which unveiled the syste-
matic nature and pervasiveness of torture in Brazil. Under the sponsorship of Cardinal 
Arns, a group of lawyers and researchers systematically surveyed official records from 
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the military courts to expose the repressive mechanisms the military regime used against 
its political opponents. The project began with the visit of Eny Raimundo Moreira, a 
Brazilian lawyer, to the Geneva headquarters of the WCC. From 1979 to 1985, “under the 
strictest secrecy”, the WCC harnessed and channeled the totality of the financial resources 
required for the fulfillment of this project. The group working on the project in Brazil took 
almost one year to clandestinely photocopy more than a million pages of court records, 
which were then analyzed and dissected by the team over the next four years. “To back up 
their work all files were regularly and systematically microfilmed and secretly smuggled 
out of the country to Geneva” (Harper 2006: 14). The book, with prologues by the WCC 
General Secretary, Philip Potter, and Cardinal Arns, was published in Brazil in 1985, 
becoming an instant bestseller.
5. Conclusions 
A notable unintended consequence of the September 11, 1973 coup was the deve-
lopment of a human rights movement that grew out of progressive church networks. 
The presence in Chile of almost 25,000 Latin American refugees who had fled from the 
military regimes in their own countries led to the intervention of international actors in 
Chilean territory, and provided an opening for the beginning of a forthright activist stance 
against repression in dictatorial Chile. In this sense, the participation of the WCC in the 
refugee operation was instrumental for encouraging the creation of a church-based human 
rights organization, COPACHI, and establishing the international contacts required for 
its functioning. This maneuver proved to be crucial in shifting the international agenda 
towards defending the human rights of Chileans. 
The approach of the WCC was thus in many respects different from the response of 
other international organizations and solidarity groups to the situation in Chile. While 
many groups acting internationally limited their role to awareness-raising and public 
denunciation on an international level, the WCC’s Chile Emergency Office would funda-
mentally help create and sustain a source of human rights defense within Chile. Its role 
therefore differed from that of other international organizations and groups in the sense 
that it would not only appeal to international publics, or to the Chilean national govern-
ment, but would also assume an operative role in helping create and sustain organizations 
in authoritarian Chile. Thus, the Chilean crisis laid the foundations of what came to be 
a center of sustained transnational and transcontinental relations in the promotion and 
defense of human rights. The fact that the Chilean human rights organizations were not a 
conscious product that the actors had in mind at the time of the coup, and were rather the 
outcome of a series of redefinitions as the central problems evolved, was related to their 
unprecedented character. In this sense, the organizations that sprung to life in Chile were 
an institutional innovation from which Latin American activists as well as international 
organizations could draw experience and served as models that were replicated across the 
continent. 
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